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Following Basu (1997),the difference between the sensitivity of accounting
earnings to negative equity return (proxy for bad news) and its sensitivity
to positive equity return (proxy for good news) is interpreted as an indi-
cator of conditional accounting conservatism. However, there is concern
that the earnings-sensitivity difference (ESD) may be affected by factors
other than conditional conservatism, and that this may impair its reli-
ability as an indicator of conditional conservatism. Motivated by such
concerns and by recognition that ﬁnancial distress could contribute to
an ESD through a conditional-conservatism route and/or through a non-
conditional-conservatism route,we examine the association between ﬁnan-
cial distress and the ESD for U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. By decomposing the
association into an element arising from accruals, which can reﬂect condi-
tional conservatism, and an element arising from cash ﬂow from operating
activities (CFO),which cannot directly reﬂect conditional conservatism,we
seek evidence as to whether such association arises through a conditional-
conservatism route or through a non-conditional-conservatism route. We
ﬁnd that positive association between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises
predominantly through the accruals component of earnings rather than the
CFO component, consistent with it arising primarily because of a higher
degree of conditional conservatism in relatively ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
The inference that there is a positive association between ﬁnancial distress
and conditional conservatism is supported by other non-equity-return-
based measures of conditional conservatism. The evidence in this paper
suggests that the effect of ﬁnancial distress does not signiﬁcantly impair the
reliability of the ESD as an indicator of conditional conservatism.
Key words: Accounting; Asymmetric timeliness; Conditional conserva-
tism; Conservatism; Financial distress.
Basu (1997) deﬁnes accounting conservatism as a tendency on the part of accoun-
tants ‘to require a higher degree of veriﬁcation for recognizing good news than bad
news in ﬁnancial statements’, resulting in accounting earnings being more timely in
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conservatism is sometimes termed conditional conservatism. Following Basu, a
piecewise-regression-based measure of the excess of the sensitivity of accounting
earnings to contemporaneous negative equity return over its sensitivity to contem-
poraneous positive equity return is widely interpreted as an indicator of asymmetric
timeliness in the accounting recognition of bad news and good news and, therefore,
of conditional conservatism. Many studies have reported positive association
between the Basu earnings sensitivity difference (ESD) and likely contracting-
related sources of demand for conditional conservatism. The ESD has been found
to be associated with measures of debt-contracting-related demand for account-
ing conservatism (Ball et al., 2008; Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008), measures of
governance-related demand for accounting conservatism (Ball et al., 2000; Beekes
et al., 2004;Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; LaFond
and Watts, 2008; García Lara, García Osma and Penalva, 2009), the expertise of
auditors (Krishnan, 2005), the litigation environment (Givoly and Hayn, 2000;
Bushman and Piotroski,2006;Lobo and Zhou,2006) and a change in rate regulation
(Sivakumar andWaymire,2003).The ESD has also been found to be associated with
the conservatism of previous periods (Pae et al., 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts,
2007) and differences in earnings constructs with respect to predicted timeliness
(Pope and Walker, 1999), consistent with a conditional-conservatism interpretation
of the ESD. However, some studies have questioned the conditional-conservatism
interpretation of the ESD on the grounds that the ESD can be affected by factors
not directly related to conditional conservatism. Such studies include Dietrich et al.
(2007) and Patatoukas and Thomas (2009), which suggest that the ESD can arise
from econometric phenomena associated with the partitioning of data with respect
to the sign of equity return, and Givoly et al. (2007), which suggests that the ESD is
affected by the nature and clustering of economic events and by ﬁrms’ disclosure
policies.
In light of concerns that have been expressed about the conditional-conservatism
interpretation of the ESD and the possibility that the effect of ﬁnancial distress
could give rise to an additional source of concern regarding this interpretation, we
examine in this paper the association between measures of ﬁnancial distress and
the ESD for U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. We recognize that association between the
ESD and ﬁnancial distress could arise through a conditional-conservatism route
if relatively ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms exhibit a relatively high degree of condi-
tional accounting conservatism. We also recognize that it could arise through a
non-conditional-conservatism route because of possible ﬁnancial-distress-related
non-linearity in the response of equity prices and returns to news reﬂected in equity
earnings,or because ﬁrms’ cash-ﬂow response to bad news and good news is related
to ﬁnancial distress.By decomposing the association between the ESD and measures
of ﬁnancial distress into an element arising from accruals, which can reﬂect condi-
tional conservatism,and an element arising from cash ﬂow from operating activities
(CFO), which cannot directly reﬂect conditional conservatism, we seek evidence as
to whether such association arises through a conditional-conservatism route and/or
through a non-conditional-conservatism route.We also provide additional evidence
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non-equity-return-based measures of conditional conservatism.
We ﬁnd a positive association between our ﬁnancial-distress measures and the
ESD. We ﬁnd that this association arises predominantly through the accruals com-
ponent of earnings rather than through the CFO component, consistent with the
association arising primarily because relatively ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms exhibit a
relatively high degree of conditional conservatism. The inference that there is a
positive association between ﬁnancial distress and conditional accounting conserva-
tism is supported by evidence from the non-equity-return-based measures of con-
ditional conservatism, and is robust to a number of methodological variations.
Overall, the evidence in this paper suggests that the effect of ﬁnancial distress does
not signiﬁcantly impair the reliability of the ESD as an indicator of conditional
accounting conservatism.
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FINANCIAL
DISTRESS AND THE EARNINGS-SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCE (ESD)
We recognize that ﬁnancial distress could be associated with the ESD because of
association between ﬁnancial distress and conditional conservatism and/or because
of ﬁnancial-distress-related non-linearity in the earnings-return relationship that
is not driven by conditional conservatism. In this section, we describe conditional-
conservatism and non-conditional-conservatism routes by which ﬁnancial distress
might be associated with the ESD, and outline relevant evidence from prior
studies.
Possible Association Between Financial Distress and the ESD Through Conditional
Accounting Conservatism
It is likely that debt-contracting is a principal source of demand for conserva-
tive accounting. Conservative accounting tends to activate lenders’ rights under
ﬁnancial-reporting-based debt covenants sooner rather than later in response to
adverse events, thereby allowing lenders to impose more timely constraints on the
ability of managers and shareholders to reduce the value of lenders’ claims. Also,
because of links between earnings and dividend payments, conservative accounting
may limit the potential adverse effects of conﬂicts between debtholders and share-
holders with regard to distributions. Empirical evidence of debt-related demand
for conservative accounting can be found in a number of studies. Ball et al. (2008)
predict a positive association between the size of countries’ debt markets relative to
their GNP and the degree of conditional accounting conservatism observed in those
countries.Their prediction is based on the expectation that demand for accounting
to produce timely violation of debt covenants in response to adverse events is
relatively high where debt markets are relatively important.Their empirical results
conﬁrm their prediction.Zhang (2008) predicts that relatively conservative account-
ing increases the probability that covenant violations will be triggered in the wake of
negative price shocks,and that part of the ex ante beneﬁt of conservative accounting
by borrowers accrues to the borrowers in the form of reduced cost of debt. Using a
ABACUS
286
© 2011 The Authors
Abacus © 2011 Accounting Foundation,The University of Sydneynumber of measures of conservatism, including the Basu (1997) ESD, she reports
evidence in support of these predictions.The study by Ahmed et al. (2002) is moti-
vated by the potential for large dividends to cause wealth transfers from debtholders
to shareholders because of increases in default risk,and the potential for accounting
conservatism in conjunction with balance-sheet-ratio-based covenants to act as
an indirect constraint on such wealth transfers. That study uses accounting-
conservatism measures other than the ESD and a number of proxies for the like-
lihood of debtholder–shareholder conﬂict to examine the association between
potential debtholder–shareholder conﬂict with regard to dividend policy and
accounting conservatism.It reports that ﬁrms that face relatively severe debtholder–
shareholder conﬂict over dividend policy tend to be more conservative in their
accounting. Motivated by the Guay and Verrecchia (2006) argument that lenders
and borrowers can write contracts that make ﬁnancial-reporting conservatism
unnecessary for debt-contracting purposes, Beatty et al. (2008) report evidence of a
debt-contracting-related demand for ﬁnancial-reporting conservatism even where
debt-contract provisions are based on conservatively adjusted GAAP. Evidence of
the likely beneﬁt of conditional conservatism for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms can be
found in the study by García Lara, García Osma and Neophytou (2009). Using
measures of conservatism other than the ESD,that study reports that U.K.ﬁrms that
eventually failed had a history of relatively low conditional conservatism in years
preceding failure.
From the foregoing, there is evidence of demand for conservative accounting to
reduce the cost of debtholder–shareholder conﬂicts by forcing the timely activation
of debtholder rights under debt covenants in the wake of adverse events and by
preventing dividend payments that might result in wealth transfers from debtholders
to shareholders.Pressure for conservative accounting from this source is likely to be
associated with the probability of default.It is therefore possible that an association
between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD could arise because relatively ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms adopt relatively conservative ﬁnancial-reporting practices.
Possible Association Between Financial Distress and the ESD Other Than Through
Conditional Accounting Conservatism
Shareholders’ termination options can cause wealth changes associated with the
equity earnings of poorly performing ﬁrms to be borne in part by stakeholders other
than shareholders and, related to this, can cause losses to be transitory. This can
cause the equity return of poorly performing ﬁrms to be relatively insensitive to
news reﬂected in equity earnings.This raises the possibility that association between
ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises because ﬁnancial distress affects the properties
of equity return as an indicator of news rather than because it induces a greater
degree of conditional conservatism in accounting.
A number of studies, both empirical and analytical, have provided evidence that
non-linearity in the relationship between equity price or equity return and equity
earnings can be attributed to factors related to termination options.Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) report a convex relationship between the market value of equity
(vertical axis) and earnings (horizontal axis), and attribute the ﬂattening of the
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respect of unproﬁtable assets.Hayn (1995) reports that the slope of the relationship
between equity returns and earnings is substantially lower for loss cases than for
proﬁt cases. This is attributed to the existence of liquidation options that are more
likely to be exercised in the presence of losses. Plummer and Tse (1999) report that
the sensitivity of equity returns (bond returns) to changes in earnings decreases
(increases) monotonically from the highest-credit-rated ﬁrms to the lowest-credit-
rated ﬁrms.This suggests that, as the probability of liquidation increases, the bond-
holders bear an increasing proportion of the value changes reﬂected in equity
earnings. Subramanyam and Wild (1996) report that the response of abnormal
equity return to changes in earnings is relatively low for relatively ﬁnancially dis-
tressed ﬁrms.This is attributed to the lower informativeness of earnings where the
going-concern status may be in question. Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) report that
the slope coefﬁcient from a reverse regression of unexpected earnings on abnormal
equity return is positively associated with default risk as inferred from bond ratings,
consistent with abnormal equity returns of relatively high-default-risk ﬁrms being
relatively unresponsive to earnings.Fischer andVerrecchia (1997) demonstrate ana-
lytically that the limited liability of shareholders gives rise to convexity in the
relationship between equity price (vertical axis) and earnings (horizontal axis).
Valuable insights regarding the impact of default risk on the return-earnings rela-
tionship are provided by Beaver and Ryan (2009).They demonstrate that,if realized
returns on debt become increasingly sensitive to realized returns on net operating
assets as the latter become smaller and as the probability of exercise of the share-
holders’ put option on the net operating assets increases,realized equity returns are
a convex function of realized returns on net operating assets.They also observe that,
prior to the introduction of SFAS 159,The FairValue Option for FinancialAssets and
Financial Liabilities (FASB, 2007), U.S.-GAAP net income reﬂected return on net
operating assets but could not reﬂect the share of that return borne by the debt-
holders when debt is risky. This leads to the prediction that risky debt induces a
convex relationship between equity returns (vertical axis) and net income (horizon-
tal axis).The connection between default risk and convexity in equity prices is also
highlighted by Easton et al. (2008).
The existence of ﬁnancial-distress-related convexity in the relationship between
equity price or equity price changes (vertical axis) and news reﬂected in earnings
(horizontal axis) could give rise to ﬁnancial-distress-related concavity in the rela-
tionship between earnings (vertical axis) and equity returns (horizontal axis) not
directly due to conditional conservatism.
Another possible source of non-conditional-conservatism-related association
between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD is an effect referred to by Ball et al. (2009).
They observe that the greater sensitivity of CFO to bad news than to good news that
has been reported in a number of studies could have arisen because ﬁrms’ corrective
actions in response to adverse events resulted in operating cash outﬂows that
occurred relatively immediately in response to those adverse events.If such an effect
were associated with ﬁnancial distress, it could also give rise to a non-conditional-
conservatism association between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD.
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and the ESD
The seminal paper by Basu (1997) brieﬂy considers the possibility that the effect of
termination options documented by Hayn (1995),rather than conditional conserva-
tism, might be the source of the ESD. He reports that, although the termination-
option theory predicts some of his results, it does not predict all of them. Among
other things, he reports a higher sensitivity difference for earnings than for cash
ﬂows, and notes that the termination-option theory does not predict this result
whereas the conditional-conservatism theory does.
Using U.S.data for periods from 1999 to 2006,Wang et al.(2009) seek evidence as
to whether the ESD is affected by ﬁnancial-distress-related distortion of the return
measure.They do so by comparing (a) the association between a measure of ﬁnan-
cial distress and the ESD where the ESD is based on equity return and equity
earnings with (b) the corresponding association where the ESD is based on esti-
mates of entity return and on pre-interest earnings.A rationale for this comparison
is that an entity-return measure that accurately impounded all periodic changes in
the value of the entity, including changes in the value of creditors’ claims that arise
because value changes reﬂected in equity earnings are borne partly by creditors,
would not be subject to the potential ﬁnancial-distress-related distortions referred to
above.To do this comparison properly,however,it is necessary to construct accurate
series of liability-value-inclusive periodic entity returns, which is very difﬁcult to do
for a large sample of ﬁrms. Wang et al. (2009) report that there is an association
between ﬁnancial distress and the normal equity-return-based ESD but no associa-
tion between ﬁnancial distress and the ESDs that are based on their estimates of
entity return, consistent with the association between ﬁnancial distress and the
equity-return-based ESD arising primarily from a non-conservatism route.
Summary
From the foregoing there is reason to believe that ﬁnancial distress could be asso-
ciated with the ESD, and that such association could arise either through a
conditional-conservatism route and/or through a non-conditional-conservatism
route. Evidence on the role of ﬁnancial distress with respect to the ESD appears
mixed. In the remainder of this paper, we seek further evidence, based on a decom-
position of the ESD into an element due to accruals and an element due to CFO,as
to whether association between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises through a
conditional-conservatism route and/or through a non-conditional-conservatism
route.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Measurement ofAssociation Between Financial Distress and the Earnings-Sensitivity
Difference (ESD)
Our principal source of evidence on whether association between ﬁnancial dis-
tress and the ESD arises through a conditional-conservatism route or through a
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element due to the accruals component of earnings and an element due to the CFO
component.The rationale for this is as follows.As outlined in the previous section,
we envisage that ﬁnancial distress could contribute to the ESD through a number of
routes. First, ﬁnancial distress could contribute to the ESD because it affects the
degree of conditional conservatism with which ﬁrms account for their activities, for
example,by inducing relatively ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms to recognize asset impair-
ment on a relatively timely basis. Any contribution by this route must operate
through accruals and not through CFO.
1 Second, ﬁnancial distress could contribute
to the ESD because it causes equity return to be relatively unresponsive to news
reﬂected in the equity earnings of relatively poorly performing ﬁrms. As noted by
Basu (1997), there is no reason to predict that such an effect on the ESD would be
concentrated in one or other of the accrual and CFO elements of the ESD. Third,
ﬁnancial distress could affect the ESD because it inﬂuences the phenomenon envis-
aged by Ball et al.(2009),whereby ﬁrms’ CFO response to good news and bad news
is asymmetric. Any contribution by this route must operate through CFO. In
summary: any association directly due to conditional accounting conservatism must
be reﬂected in the accruals component of earnings and not in the CFO component;
any association due to equity return being relatively unresponsive to news reﬂected
in the equity earnings of relatively poorly performing ﬁrms could be reﬂected in the
accruals component and the CFO component; and any effect due to asymmetric
CFO response to good news and bad news must operate through the CFO compo-
nent. On the basis of this, we conclude that evidence that association between
ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises predominantly from accruals would suggest
that the association arises primarily through a conditional-conservatism route, and
that evidence that it derives predominantly from CFO or in equal measure from
accruals and CFO would suggest that it arises to a signiﬁcant degree through a
non-conservatism route.
In common with many previous studies, the earnings construct for which we
measure the ESD is earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI).We also measure
the ESD with a control for the beginning-of-period book-to-market ratio. We do
so in light of evidence in Pae et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007)
that conditional conservatism as measured by the ESD is relatively high when the
cumulative conservatism of earlier periods is relatively low, as reﬂected in a rela-
tively high book-to-market ratio. We measure the association between ﬁnancial
distress and the ESD for EBEI by including a ﬁnancial-distress interaction term in
the ESD-measurement regression models. We investigate whether any association
between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises though a conditional-conservatism
1 We acknowledge the possibility that CFO might be affected by conditional conservatism through
conservatism-related decisions to expense items, in which case they would appear as part of CFO, or
to capitalize them, in which case they would appear as part of cash ﬂows from investing activities.
In light of this, we perform a sensitivity test in which we use cash ﬂow from operating and investing
activities (CFOI), with a corresponding accruals measure, in place of CFO. As reported later
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models of the same forms for the accruals component of EBEI and the CFO
component of EBEI. In each of our regression models, we use pooled cross-section
and time-series data. Following Petersen (2008) and Gow et al. (2010), t- statistics
for all of our regression models are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and
by year.
2 As a sensitivity test, we also estimate each regression model separately
for each of the seventeen years covered by the study without allowing for clus-
tering, with test statistics being based on the seventeen-year averages of the
regression coefﬁcients. Because the explanatory variables in each of the ESD-
measurement regression models described below are the same for EBEI, accruals
and CFO and because EBEI is deﬁned to be the sum of accruals and CFO,
a regression coefﬁcient for EBEI from any of these models must equal the sum
of the corresponding regression coefﬁcients for accruals and CFO. This means
that the coefﬁcients measuring the ESD and the effect of ﬁnancial distress on
the ESD are each equal to the sum of the corresponding coefﬁcients for
accruals and CFO.
In order to aid comparability with other studies, we ﬁrst estimate models that
measure the ESD without taking account of ﬁnancial distress. Model (1) is the
standard Basu (1997) regression model, and model (2) is the same model with a
control for the beginning-of-period book-to-market ratio:
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where Xit is either EBEI, CFO or accruals, where accruals are deﬁned as EBEI
less CFO, for ﬁrm i for the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t, scaled
by beginning-of-period market value; Rit is the equity return for ﬁrm i for the
accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t; DRit is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one where Rit is negative, and 0 otherwise; BMi,t-1 is the annually
computed percentile rank of the book-to-market ratio for ﬁrm i as at the begin-
ning of the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t; the b terms are
regression coefﬁcients; and the e terms are error terms. Where earnings is the
dependent variable, the coefﬁcient b1,4 in (1) is the Basu (1997) ESD. A signiﬁcant
positive value for this coefﬁcient for earnings is conventionally interpreted as
evidence that earnings is more timely in its recognition of bad news than in
its recognition of good news, consistent with conditional conservatism. In (2), the
coefﬁcient b2,8 reﬂects the effect of the beginning-of-period book-to-market ratio
on the sensitivity difference and b2,4 measures the sensitivity difference after
controlling for the book-to-market ratio.
2 We obtain t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and by year using a Stata program
written by Mitchell Petersen.
FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND THE EARNINGS-SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCE
291
© 2011 The Authors
Abacus © 2011 Accounting Foundation,The University of SydneyModels (3) and (4) address the key object of interest in this study. Through
interaction terms for ﬁnancial distress, they measure the effect of ﬁnancial distress
on the sensitivity differences for EBEI, accruals and CFO:
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where FDi,t-1 is the annually computed percentile rank of a ﬁnancial-distress
measure, for which further details are given below, as at the beginning of the
accounting period ended at time t, and other notation is as previously deﬁned. In
(3), the principal focus of interest is b3,8, which reﬂects the effect of ﬁnancial dis-
tress on the sensitivity difference. A signiﬁcant positive value of b3,8 for EBEI
would indicate a positive association between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD. A
signiﬁcant positive value of b3,8 for CFO would indicate that association between
ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises through CFO, consistent with such associa-
tion arising at least in part through a non-conditional-conservatism route. A sig-
niﬁcant positive value of b3,8 for accruals would indicate that association between
ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises through accruals. In the absence of a corre-
sponding signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for CFO, this would be consistent with the asso-
ciation arising primarily because relatively ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms exhibit a
relatively high degree of conditional conservatism. In model (4), which includes a
control for the beginning-of-period book-to-market ratio, the principal focus of
interest is b4,8. This reﬂects for each of the dependent variables the effect of
ﬁnancial distress on the sensitivity difference in the presence of a control for the
book-to-market ratio.
Measurement ofAssociation Between Financial Distress and Non-Equity-Return-
Based Measures of Conditional Conservatism
For additional evidence on whether ﬁnancial distress is associated with conditional
conservatism, we use two measures that do not use equity returns.The ﬁrst of these
measures, due to Basu (1997), reﬂects the difference between the next-period
reversal of negative earnings changes and the next-period reversal of positive earn-
ings changes. The rationale for this measure is that the recognition of a large
proportion of a time t-1 economic event in the earnings of time t-1 will cause,
other things equal, a substantial reversal at time t in the earnings change that
occurred at time t-1. Under conditional conservatism, the accounting recognition
of bad news, giving rise to negative earnings changes, is more timely than the
accounting recognition of good news, giving rise to positive earnings changes, and
it is therefore expected that the next-period reversal of negative earnings changes
will be greater than the next-period reversal of positive earnings changes. The
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where DEBEIit is the change in EBEI of ﬁrm i from the accounting period ended
at balance-sheet date t-1 to the period ended at balance-sheet date t, scaled by
total assets at balance-sheet date t-1; DDEBEIi,t-1 is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one where DEBEIi,t-1 is negative and 0 otherwise; and other notation
is as previously deﬁned. b5,4 indicates whether earnings-change reversal is greater
for negative earnings changes than for positive earnings changes: b5,4 < 0 implies
more timely recognition of bad news than of good news,consistent with conditional
accounting conservatism. The addition of ﬁnancial-distress interaction terms in
model (6) enables us to observe the effect of ﬁnancial distress on conditional
conservatism as measured by reference to earnings-change reversal:
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where notation is as previously deﬁned. b6,8 indicates whether conditional conser-
vatism measured by reference to earnings-change reversal is associated with ﬁnan-
cial distress: b6,8 < 0 implies that it is more pronounced for relatively ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms. If such a ﬁnancial distress effect is attributable to accounting con-
servatism, then this effect should be observable in the accruals element of earnings
and not in the cash-ﬂow element. As supplementary evidence with respect to
results from model (6), we therefore estimate regression models (7) and (8).These
models are of the same form as model (6), but with change in accruals and change
in CFO, respectively, in place of change in earnings. The models are as follows:
ΔΔ Δ Δ Δ ACC D ACC ACC ACC D A i t it it it =+ + + × −−− ββ β β 71 72 1 73 1 74 1 , , ,, ,, , C CC
FD D ACC FD ACC
it
it it it it
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,, , , , , ,
−
−− − − ++ × + ×
1
7 5 17 6 1 17 7 1 ββ β ΔΔ F FD
ACC D ACC FD
it
it it it i t
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,, ,, , ,
−
−− − +× × +
1
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ΔΔ Δ Δ Δ CFO D CFO CFO CFO D C i t it it it =+ + + × −−− ββ β β 81 82 1 83 1 84 1 , , ,, ,, , F FO
FD D CFO FD CFO
it
it it it it
,
,, , , , , ,
−
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1
8 5 18 6 1 18 7 1 ββ β ΔΔ F FD
CFO D CFO FD
it
it it it i t
,
,, , , , ,
−
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1
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(8)
where DACCit (DCFOit) is the change in accruals (CFO) of ﬁrm i from the account-
ing period ended at balance-sheet date t-1 to the period ended at balance-sheet
date t, scaled by total assets at t-1; DDACCi,t-1 (DDCFOi,t-1) is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one where DACCi,t-1 (DCFOi,t-1) is negative and 0 otherwise;
and other notation is as previously deﬁned.
The second of our non-equity-return-based measures follows Ball and Shivaku-
mar (2005). It comprises the difference between the sensitivity of accruals to nega-
tive CFO and the sensitivity of accruals to positive CFO. The rationale for this
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there is a mechanical negative association between accruals and CFO. In bad-news
periods as proxied by negative cash ﬂows, this negative association is likely to be
reduced because economic losses are recognized on a timely basis through negative
accruals whereas economic gains are recognized only when realized and are
accounted for on a cash basis. The accruals-CFO-based measure of conditional
conservatism is given by the following regression model:
ACC DCFO CFO CFO DCFO it it it it it it =+ + + × + ββ β β ε 91 92 93 94 9 ,, , , , , (9)
where ACCit is accruals for ﬁrm i for the accounting period ended at balance-sheet
date t, scaled by beginning-of-period total assets; CFOit is CFO for ﬁrm i for the
accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t,scaled by beginning-of-period total
assets; DCFOit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one where CFOit is
negative and 0 otherwise; and other notation is as previously deﬁned. b9,4 indicates
whether the response of accruals to contemporaneous CFO is less negative for
negative CFO than for positive CFO:b9,4 > 0 implies more timely recognition of bad
news than of good news, consistent with conditional accounting conservatism. The
addition of ﬁnancial-distress interaction terms in model (10) enables us to observe
the effect of ﬁnancial distress on conditional conservatism as measured by the
accruals-CFO-based measure:
ACC DCFO CFO CFO DCFO it it it it it =+ + + × + ββ β β β 10 1 10 2 10 3 10 4 10 5 ,, , , , F FD
DCFO FD CFO FD
CFO
it






−− +× + ×
+
1
10 6 1 10 7 1
10 8
ββ
β × ×× + − DCFO FD it i t it ,, , 11 0 ε
(10)
where notation is as previously deﬁned. b10,8 indicates whether conditional conser-
vatism measured by reference to the response of accruals to cash ﬂows is associated
with ﬁnancial distress: b10,8 > 0 implies that it is more pronounced for relatively
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
Measures of Financial Distress
In estimating regression models (3), (4), (6), (7), (8) and (10), we use two measures
of ﬁnancial distress. The ﬁrst of these is based on recent option-pricing-model-
based developments in the measurement of ﬁnancial distress, and the second is a
more longstanding measure. First, we use the annually computed percentile rank
of the Hillegeist et al. (2004) BSM Score for ﬁrm i as at the beginning of the
accounting period ended at time t. The BSM Score is derived from the option-
pricing literature pioneered by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974),
hence the acronym ‘BSM’. It relies in particular on the insight developed in
Vassalou and Xing (2004) that the equity of a ﬁrm can be viewed as a call option
on the assets of the ﬁrm, where the exercise price of the option is equal to the face
value of the ﬁrm’s liabilities and the probability that the call option is not exer-
cised by the shareholders is interpreted as a probability of bankruptcy. The BSM
Score is derived from the following adaptation of the Black–Scholes–Merton
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option on the ﬁrm’s assets:
VV e N dL e N d eV EA
Tr T T
A =− + −



























In (11.a),(11.b) and (11.c):VA denotes the current market value of assets,treated as
the underlying asset on which the call option is written;N(.) denotes the cumulative
density function of the standard normal distribution; L denotes the value of liabili-
ties maturing at time T, treated as the exercise price of the call option; r is the
continuously compounded risk-free rate of return;d is the continuous dividend rate,
expressed as a proportion of the current market value of assets; sA is the standard
deviation of asset returns. From the above, Hillegeist et al. (2004) deﬁne as in (12)
below the‘BSM Prob’.This is derived from d2 in (11.c),which is the probability that
the value of the liabilities at their maturity will exceed the value of the assets at that
date and that the call option will not be exercised,and which is treated as a measure
















where m is the continuously compounded expected rate of return on the assets,which
is used in place of the risk-free rate of return from (11.c). For the purpose of their
empirical tests, Hillegeist et al. ﬁnd it convenient to re-express their BSM Prob as a






− ( ) 1
. (13)
As Hillegeist et al. observe, the negatively signed term within brackets on
the right-hand side of (12) comprises the logarithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s assets
to its liabilities (=ln(VA/L)) plus the expected annual growth in asset values
(=−− μδ σ () A
2 2 ), deﬂated by a term reﬂecting the volatility in asset returns.
Recently developed option-pricing-model-based indicators of ﬁnancial distress such
as the Hillegeist et al. BSM Score differ from more traditional ﬁnancial-distress
measures,such as the Z Score (Altman,1968) and the O Score (Ohlson,1980),in the
3 As we use percentile ranks of our ﬁnancial-distress measures, it makes no difference for our reported
results whether or not we apply the transformation in (13). We do, however, use the raw ﬁnancial-
distress measures in a sensitivity test.
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(2004) suggests that the BSM Score is more effective than the Z Score and the O
Score in predicting bankruptcy.
Second, we also use as a measure of ﬁnancial distress the annually computed
percentile rank of the Altman (1968) Z Score for ﬁrm i as at the beginning of the
accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t.As higher values of the Z Score are
likely to be associated with lower levels of ﬁnancial distress,we multiply the Z Score
by -1.The Altman (1968) Z Score is deﬁned as follows:
ZB B B B B it it it it it it =× +× +× +× +× 12 14 33 06 10 12345 ..... , ,,,,,(14)
where Zit is the Z Score for ﬁrm i at balance-sheet date t, B1,it is current assets less
current liabilities all divided by total assets,B2,it is retained earnings divided by total
assets,B3,it is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets,B4,it is market




Our data are drawn from non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed on the NewYork Stock Exchange
and the American Stock Exchange for any part of the period from 1989 to 2005. In
using New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange ﬁrms, we are
consistent with Basu (1997). Our data start in 1989, which is the ﬁrst full year for
which U.S. ﬁrms were required to publish a Statement of Cash Flows in accordance
with SFAS 95, Statement of Cash Flows (FASB, 1987).
4 This avoids the need to
estimate CFO indirectly from income-statement and balance-sheet data, and the
consequent danger that the CFO measure might be contaminated by accruals. Our
data predate the introduction of SFAS 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial
Assets and Financial Liabilities (FASB, 2007), so the inﬂuence of the fair-value
option in allowing the carrying value of ﬁrms’ liabilities to reﬂect periodic changes
in default risk is absent in our data.
Annual equity returns are obtained from CRSP.For EBEI we use Compustat data
item 18 (Income Before Extraordinary Items). On the basis of our own comparison
of Compustat data with a sample of published ﬁnancial statements, we follow the
approach recommended by Hribar and Collins (2002) in order to measure CFO and
accruals. For CFO, we use Compustat data item 308 (Operating Activities-Net Cash
Flow (Statement of Cash Flows)) less Compustat data item 124 (Extraordinary
Items and Discontinued Operations (Statement of Cash Flows)).Accruals are then
deﬁned as EBEI less CFO.
5 In regression models (1),(2),(3) and (4),EBEI,accruals
4 SFAS 95 was effective for ﬁscal years ending after 15 July 1988.
5 Our comparison of Compustat-reported data with published ﬁnancial-statement data showed that
extraordinary-items-related cash ﬂows that are excluded from CFO in the ﬁnancial statements are
often reported as part of Compustat data item 308. In such cases, it is appropriate to subtract
Compustat data item 124 from Compustat data item 308 in order to give a CFO measure that can be
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product of the number of common shares outstanding and the closing share price as
reported by Compustat (Compustat data item 25 (Common Shares Outstanding)
times Compustat data item 199 (Price-Fiscal Year-Close)). In regression models (5)
to (10), EBEI items, accruals items and cash-ﬂow items are scaled by Compustat
data item 6 (TotalAssets) at time t-1.The book-to-market ratio is equal to the book
value of equity (Compustat data item 60 (Common Equity-Total)) divided by the
market value of equity as deﬁned above. In order to calculate the Hillegeist et al.
(2004) BSM Score, we use the following inputs for the accounting period ended at
time t-1:for total liabilities,denoted L,Compustat data item 181 (Liabilities-Total);
market value of equity at the balance-sheet date (as deﬁned above); dividends as
reported by Compustat (Compustat data item 21 (Dividends-Common) plus Com-
pustat data item 19 (Dividends-Preferred)), which are divided by the sum of total
liabilities and the market value of equity to give an estimate of dividend expressed
as a proportion of the current market value of assets,denoted d.The maturity of the
liabilities, denoted T, is set to one year as in Hillegeist et al. (2004).The estimates of
the value of assets (VA) and of the annualized standard deviation of assets (sA) used
for the BSM Score are given by the simultaneous-equation procedure that is
documented in detail in Hillegeist et al. (2004, Appendix). This procedure uses the
inputs referred to above plus the annualized standard deviation of equity returns for
the year ended at balance-sheet date t-1. The estimate of the continuously com-
pounded return on assets, denoted m, is derived from the estimates of the value of
assets given by the simultaneous-equation procedure, together with observed divi-
dends. As in Hillegeist et al., m is winsorized such that it has a minimum possible
value equal to the one-year Treasury Bill rate and a maximum possible value of
100%.
6 In order to calculate the Altman (1968) Z Score, we use the following
inputs for the accounting period ended at time t-1: current assets (Compustat
data item 4 (Current Assets—Total)); current liabilities (Compustat data item 5
(Current Liabilities—Total)); total assets (as deﬁned above); retained earnings
(Compustat data item 36 (Retained Earnings)); earnings before interest and taxes
(Compustat data item 13 (Operating Income Before Depreciation) less Compustat
data item 14 (Depreciation and Amortization)); market value of equity (as deﬁned
above); total liabilities (as deﬁned above); sales (Compustat data item 12
(Sales—Net)).
We collect data for all ﬁrm-year cases for which the data necessary for the
construction of our measures of EBEI, accruals, CFO, equity return, the Hillegeist
et al. BSM Score, the Altman Z Score and the book-to-market ratio are available
subtracted from EBEI to give a measure of accruals. In a sensitivity test, we also use the unadjusted
data item 308 as the measure of operating cash ﬂow and data item 18 less data item 308 as the measure
of accruals. (Hribar and Collins, 2002, use Compustat data item 123 (Income Before Extraordinary
Items (Statement of Cash Flows)),whereas we use Compustat data item 18,taken from the Statement
of Income, and eliminate the approximately 2% of cases where Compustat data item 18 is not equal
to Compustat data item 123.)
6 SAS code for the calculation of the BSM Score is helpfully provided in an appendix to Hillegeist et al.
(2004).This code was used in our measurement of the BSM Score.
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the top and bottom 1% of the distributions of EBEI,accruals and CFO,all scaled by
beginning-of period market value of equity, and equity return are eliminated as
outliers. This leaves 21,513 cases, as described in Table 1 Panel A. Details of the
distribution of these 21,513 cases by year are given inTable 1 Panel B.Details of the
distribution by industry group are given in Table 1 Panel C.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for equity return, EBEI scaled by
beginning-of period market value of equity, accruals scaled by beginning-of period
market value of equity, CFO scaled by beginning-of period market value of equity,
the beginning-of-period BSM Score, the beginning-of-period Z Score times -1 and
the beginning-of-period book-to-market ratio. For the BSM score and Z Score
ﬁnancial-distress measures and the book-to-market ratio,we use annually computed
rank data in our regression models, but the descriptive statistics for these items in
Table 2 are for raw data. Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation
matrices for the items reported in Table 2. Here, the correlation coefﬁcients for the
ﬁnancial-distress measures and the book-to-market measure are for rank data as
used in our regression models. We note that the beginning-of-period ﬁnancial-
distress measures are negatively correlated with EBEI and that this negative corre-
lation is due to negative correlation between the ﬁnancial-distress measures and
accruals,consistent with beginning-of-period ﬁnancial distress being associated with
conservative accounting.
Financial Distress and the Basu (1997) Earnings-Sensitivity Difference
Before examining the effect of ﬁnancial distress on the ESD, we ﬁrst report
in Table 4 the parameter estimates for EBEI, accruals and CFO from the ESD-
measurement regression models that do not include a ﬁnancial-distress term.
Model (1) is the standard Basu (1997) model; model (2) includes a control for the
beginning-of-period book-to-market ratio. Consistent with numerous previous
studies,the b1,4 sensitivity-difference coefﬁcient from model (1) for EBEI is positive
and signiﬁcantly different from zero (b1,4 = 0.209,t-statistic 7.51).This is convention-
ally interpreted as indicating that EBEI is more timely in its recognition of bad news
than in its recognition of good news, consistent with conditional conservatism. A
signiﬁcant sensitivity difference is observed in both the accruals component of EBEI
(b1,4 = 0.136,t-statistic 4.56) and the CFO component of EBEI (b1,4 = 0.073,t-statistic
5.35). The existence of a positive sensitivity difference for CFO is consistent with
results reported in Basu (1997), Ball et al. (2000) and Dietrich et al. (2007). Since
CFO is measured directly from the Statement of Cash Flows and should not there-
fore be directly affected by conditional accounting conservatism, this indicates that
a substantial proportion of the sensitivity difference for EBEI is due to factors
other than conditional accounting conservatism.
7 From model (2), the introduction
of a control for the beginning-of-period book-to-market ratio as a proxy for the
7 We also use the data for model (1) to replicate a test in Hayn (1995), in which return is regressed on
earnings levels separately for proﬁt cases and for loss cases.The untabulated results from this test are
very similar to those reported by Hayn (p. 135), with the return-earnings slope coefﬁcient being
signiﬁcantly steeper for proﬁt cases than for loss cases.
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DETAILS OF FIRM-YEAR CASES USED IN THE STUDY
Panel A: Construction of sample
Firm-year cases for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the
American Stock Exchange for any part of the period from 1989 to 2005 for which necessary
data are available from Compustat or CRSP, as applicable
22,778
Less: observations in the top and bottom 1% of the distributions of equity return, earnings
before extraordinary items (EBEI), accruals and cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO),
deleted as outliers
(1,265)
Firm-year cases used in the study 21,513



















Firm-year cases used in the study 21,513
Panel C: Composition of sample by industry group
Industry group (SIC codes)
Metal Mining (10) 468
Coal Mining (12), Oil & Gas Extraction (13), Pipelines Except Natural Gas (46) 1,405
Forestry (08), Nonmetallic Minerals Except Fuels (14), General Building Contractors (15),
Special Trade Contractors (17), Buiding Materials & Garden Supplies (52)
178
Heavy Construction Except Building (16) 126
Agriculture (01), Food & Kindred Products (20),Tobacco (21) 801
Textile Mill Products (22) 159
Apparel & Other Textile Products (23) 281
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CONTINUED
Panel C: Composition of sample by industry group
Lumber & Wood Products (24) 120
Furniture & Fixtures (25) 190
Paper & Allied Products (26) 500
Printing & Publishing (27) 416
Chemicals & Allied Products (28) 1,697
Petroleum & Coal (29) 370
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products (30) 305
Leather & Leather Products (31) 136
Stone, Clay & Glass Products (32) 274
Primary Metal Industries (33) 603
Fabricated Metal Products (34) 566
Industrial Machinery & Equipment (35) 1,432
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment (36) 1,493
Transportation Equipment (37) 777
Instruments & Related Products (38) 1,046
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries (39) 243
Railroad Transportation (40),Trucking & Warehousing (42),Transportation Services (47) 233
Water Transportation (44) 162
Transportation by Air (45) 187
Communications (48) 763
Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services (49) 1,242
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods (50) 515
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods (51) 280
General Merchandise Stores (53) 281
Food Stores (54) 274
Apparel & Accessory Stores (56) 266
Furniture & Home Furnishings Stores (57) 161
Eating & Drinking Places (58) 288
Miscellaneous Retail (59) 396
Hotels & Other Lodging Places (70) 141
Business Services (73) 1,178
Automotive Dealers & Service Stations (55),Auto-Repair Services & Parking (75) 171
Motion Pictures (78) 113
Amusement & Recreation Services (79) 269
Health Services (80) 417
Engineering & Management Services (87) 315
Personal Services (72), Educational Services (82), Social Services (83), Miscellaneous 275
Firm-year cases used in the study 21,513
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als to become insigniﬁcantly different from zero (b2,4 = 0.015, t-statistic 0.76),
consistent with a conditional-conservatism interpretation of the ESD. The corre-
sponding coefﬁcient for CFO remains positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero
(b2,4 = 0.101, t-statistic 6.34).
Table 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable NM S D Percentile 1 Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Percentile 99




21,513 0.032 0.130 -0.509 0.016 0.055 0.086 0.252




21,513 0.132 0.151 -0.212 0.055 0.111 0.187 0.671
BSM Score 21,513 -14.298 9.309 -36.044 -20.734 -12.392 -6.729 -0.389
Z Score (times -1) 21,513 -3.959 9.244 -24.106 -4.383 -2.915 -1.886 1.210
Book-to-market ratio 21,513 0.620 0.555 -0.329 0.326 0.529 0.796 2.540
Note: Data are for U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1989 to 2005. Equity return is the annual equity return for ﬁrm
i for the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t (expressed as a proportion); earnings before extraor-
dinary items (EBEI),accruals and cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO) are deﬂated by beginning-of-period
market value of equity; the BSM Score is the Hillegeist et al. BSM Score at the beginning of the accounting
period; Z Score (times -1) is the Altman Z Score at the beginning of the accounting period times -1; the
book-to-market ratio is measured at the beginning of the period.Observations falling in the top and bottom 1%











Equity return 1.00 0.42 -0.01 0.26 -0.01 0.03 0.07
EBEI 0.24 1.00 0.18 0.41 -0.15 -0.08 0.06
Accruals -0.01 0.54 1.00 -0.72 -0.24 -0.42 -0.35
CFO 0.23 0.25 -0.69 1.00 0.08 0.30 0.33
BSM Score 0.05 -0.22 -0.27 0.11 1.00 0.33 0.28
Z Score (times -1) 0.04 -0.16 -0.33 0.24 0.33 1.00 0.30
Book-to-market ratio 0.07 -0.06 -0.31 0.30 0.28 0.30 1.00
Note: Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefﬁcients are below (above) the diagonal. Data are for U.S.
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1989 to 2005 (21,513 observations).The correlation coefﬁcients are for the data
used in our regression models, including annually computed rank data for the Hillegeist et al. beginning-
of-period BSM Score, the Altman beginning-of-period Z Score (times -1) and the beginning-of-period
book-to-market ratio. EBEI (earnings before extraordinary items), accruals and CFO (cash ﬂow from
operating activities) are all scaled by the beginning-of-period market value of equity.
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ﬁnancial-distress terms. The results from use of the BSM Score as the ﬁnancial-
distress measure are reported in Panel A, and those from use of the Z Score are
reported in Panel B.The objects of interest here are (a) whether the ESD for EBEI
is associated with ﬁnancial distress and (b) whether any such association arises from
Table 4
SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCES FOR EARNINGS BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS (EBEI),
ACCRUALS AND CASH FLOW FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES (CFO):WITHOUT
FINANCIAL-DISTRESS MEASURE
Model (1) Model (2)
EBEI Accruals CFO EBEI Accruals CFO
Intercept (b1,1) 0.052 -0.083 0.135 (b2,1) 0.063 -0.006 0.069
(16.73)** (-13.48)** (26.48)** (10.39)** (-1.38) (12.00)**
DRit (b1,2) -0.003 0.004 -0.007 (b2,2) -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(-0.54) (0.65) (-2.56)* (-0.14) (0.20) (-0.31)
Rit (b1,3) 0.015 -0.033 0.048 (b2,3) -0.005 -0.008 0.003
(1.75) (-3.03)** (7.06)** (-0.52) (-0.76) (0.33)
Rit ¥ DRit (b1,4) 0.209 0.136 0.073 (b2,4) 0.116 0.015 0.101
(7.51)** (4.56)** (5.35)** (6.91)** (0.76) (6.34)**
BMi,t-1 (b2,5) -0.021 -0.152 0.131
(-1.75) (-8.34)** (9.68)**
DRit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b2,6) -0.003 0.006 -0.009
(-0.22) (0.58) (-0.95)
Rit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b2,7) 0.038 -0.039 0.077
(2.95)** (-2.04)* (4.03)**
Rit ¥ DRit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b2,8) 0.227 0.290 -0.063
(3.62)** (3.62)** (-1.63)
Adjusted R
2 10.5% 1.0% 5.6% 12.9% 11.2% 14.2%
Notes:
1. Regression models (1) and (2) are estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series data for U.S.
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1989 to 2005.The number of observations is 21,513.The models are as follows:
XD R R R D R it it it it it it =+ + + × + ββ β β ε 11 12 13 14 1 ,, , , , , (1)
XD R R R D R B M D R it it it it it i t i =+ + + × + + − ββ β β β β 21 22 23 24 25 1 26 ,, , , ,, , t ti t
it i t it it i t it
BM
RB M RD RB M
×




,, , , , ,
1
27 1 28 1 2 ββ ε (2)
where Xit is either (i) EBEI, (ii) Accruals or (iii) CFO, deﬂated by beginning-of-period market value
of equity, for ﬁrm i for the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t; Rit is the equity return for
ﬁrm i for the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t;DRit is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one when Rit is negative, and 0 otherwise: BMt-1 is the annually computed percentile rank of
the book-to-market ratio of ﬁrm i at the beginning of the accounting period ended at time t;theb terms
are regression coefﬁcients; the e terms are error terms.
2. t-statistics are given in parentheses.* (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level in a two-tailed test.
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and by year.
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SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCES FOR EARNINGS BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS (EBEI),
ACCRUALS AND CASH FLOW FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES (CFO):WITH
FINANCIAL-DISTRESS MEASURE
Panel A: BSM Score as the ﬁnancial-distress measure
Model (3) Model (4)
EBEI Accruals CFO EBEI Accruals CFO
Intercept (b3,1) 0.070 -0.038 0.108 (b4,1) 0.072 0.012 0.060
(22.49)** (-11.35)** (26.79)** (13.21)** (1.97)* (11.22)**
DRit (b3,2) 0.001 0.005 -0.004 (b4,2) 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.28) (1.02) (-0.64) (0.31) (0.04) (0.33)
Rit (b3,3) 0.044 0.029 0.015 (b4,3) 0.028 0.028 -0.000
(4.99)** (3.76)** (1.00) (3.90)** (3.01)** (-0.02)
Rit ¥ DRit (b3,4) -0.015 -0.100 0.085 (b4,4) -0.059 -0.139 0.080
(-0.59) (-3.54)** (3.82)** (-2.13)* (-4.40)** (4.00)**
FDi,t-1 (b3,5) -0.046 -0.114 0.068 (b4,5) -0.043 -0.078 0.035
(-5.19)** (-6.03)** (5.25)** (-5.20)** (-5.70)** (3.49)**
DRit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b3,6) -0.019 -0.003 -0.016 (b4,6) -0.020 -0.001 -0.019
(-1.22) (-0.17) (-1.47) (-1.32) (-0.12) (-1.40)
Rit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b3,7) -0.033 -0.067 0.034 (b4,7) -0.053 -0.049 -0.004
(-1.61) (-6.26)** (1.67) (-2.52)* (-4.91)** (-0.20)
Rit ¥ DRit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b3,8) 0.297 0.273 0.024 (b4,8) 0.254 0.195 0.059
(4.87)** (4.50)** (0.74) (5.13)** (4.32)** (2.09)*
BMi,t-1 (b4,9) -0.008 -0.128 0.120
(-0.76) (-9.05)** (9.38)**
DRit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b4,10) 0.007 0.010 -0.003
(0.59) (0.82) (-0.28)
Rit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b4,11) 0.052 -0.027 0.079
(3.91)** (-1.30) (3.85)**
Rit ¥ DRit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b4,12) 0.179 0.258 -0.079
(3.31)** (3.41)** (-2.00)*
Adjusted R
2 15.3% 7.5% 7.3% 16.7% 14.1% 14.4%
Panel B: Z Score as the ﬁnancial-distress measure
Model (3) Model (4)
EBEI Accruals CFO EBEI Accruals CFO
Intercept (b3,1) 0.065 -0.006 0.071 (b4,1) 0.070 0.034 0.036
(14.32)** (-1.29) (14.29)** (11.96)** (5.39)** (6.35)**
DRit (b3,2) 0.003 -0.001 0.004 (b4,2) 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.63) (-0.15) (0.73) (0.99) (0.34) (0.78)
Rit (b3,3) 0.042 0.014 0.028 (b4,3) 0.022 0.028 -0.006
(3.61)** (2.80)** (2.45)* (1.98)* (2.21)* (-0.58)
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CONTINUED
Panel B: Z Score as the ﬁnancial-distress measure
Model (3) Model (4)
EBEI Accruals CFO EBEI Accruals CFO
Rit ¥ DRit (b3,4) 0.045 -0.022 0.067 (b4,4) 0.013 -0.077 0.090
(2.59)** (-1.14) (4.67)** (0.61) (-2.76)** (5.36)**
FDi,t-1 (b3,5) -0.027 -0.156 0.129 (b4,5) -0.023 -0.121 0.098
(-3.13)** (-14.90)** (15.19)** (-3.05)** (-12.94)** (11.07)**
DRit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b3,6) -0.017 0.001 -0.018 (b4,6) -0.016 -0.002 -0.014
(-1.08) (0.10) (-1.66) (-1.01) (-0.19) (-1.16)
Rit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b3,7) -0.049 -0.079 0.030 (b4,7) -0.063 -0.075 0.012
(-1.70) (-4.34)** (1.39) (-2.28)* (-3.74)** (0.68)
Rit ¥ DRit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b3,8) 0.308 0.282 0.026 (b4,8) 0.261 0.213 0.048
(5.36)** (5.21)** (0.75) (5.67)** (4.94)** (1.56)
BMi,t-1 (b4,9) -0.012 -0.112 0.100
(-1.09) (-6.43)** (6.90)**
DRit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b4,10) -0.001 0.002 -0.003
(-0.07) (0.17) (-0.23)
Rit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b4,11) 0.050 -0.029 0.079
(4.46)** (-1.58) (3.99)**
Rit ¥ DRit ¥ BMi,t-1 (b4,12) 0.144 0.222 -0.078
(2.69)** (2.82)** (-1.85)
Adjusted R
2 14.6% 12.5% 11.5% 15.8% 17.8% 16.9%
Notes:
1. Regression models (3) and (4) are estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series data for U.S.
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1989 to 2005.The number of observations is 21,513.The models are as follows:
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where Xit is either (i) EBEI, (ii) Accruals or (iii) CFO, deﬂated by beginning-of-period market value
of equity, for ﬁrm i for the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t; Rit is the equity return for
ﬁrm i for the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date t;DRit is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one when Rit is negative, and 0 otherwise: FDi,t-1 is a measure of ﬁnancial distress, equal to
either (i) the annually computed percentile rank of the Hillegeist et al. BSM Score for ﬁrm i at the
beginning of the period ended at time t or (ii) the annually computed percentile rank of theAltman Z
Score (times -1) at the beginning of the period ended at time t; BMt-1 is the annually computed
percentile rank of the book-to-market ratio of ﬁrm i at the beginning of the period ended at time t;the
b terms are regression coefﬁcients; the e terms are error terms.
2. t-statistics are given in parentheses.* (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level in a two-tailed test.
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and by year.
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and (4) for both the BSM Score and the Z Score, all of the coefﬁcients on the
interaction term for the ESD and ﬁnancial distress (Rit ¥ FDit ¥ DRit for EBEI) are
positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level:b3,8 (BSM Score,EBEI)
= 0.297, t-statistic 4.87; b4,8 (BSM Score, EBEI) = 0.254, t-statistic 5.13; b3,8 (Z Score,
EBEI) = 0.308, t-statistic 5.36; b4,8 (Z Score, EBEI) = 0.261, t-statistic 5.67. The
breakdown between accruals and CFO of the association between ﬁnancial distress
and the ESD suggests that the association arises predominantly from accruals. For
both the BSM Score and the Z Score, all of the coefﬁcients on the interaction term
for the sensitivity difference for accruals (Rit ¥ FDit ¥ DRit for accruals) are positive
and signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level: b3,8 (BSM Score, accruals) =
0.273, t-statistic 4.50; b4,8 (BSM Score, accruals) = 0.195, t-statistic 4.32; b3,8 (Z Score,
accruals) = 0.282, t-statistic 5.21; b4,8 (Z Score, accruals) = 0.213, t-statistic 4.94.
Although all of the four corresponding coefﬁcients for CFO are positive,only one of
them is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level: b3,8 (BSM Score, CFO) =
0.024, t-statistic 0.74; b4,8 (BSM Score, CFO) = 0.059, t-statistic 2.09; b3,8 (Z Score,
CFO) = 0.026,t-statistic 0.75;b4,8 (Z Score,CFO) = 0.048,t-statistic 1.56.As we report
in our later subsection on sensitivity tests, the signiﬁcance at the 5% level of the b4,8
(BSM Score, CFO) coefﬁcient is not robust to any of our sensitivity tests. We also
note that, after inclusion of the ﬁnancial-distress interaction term, none of
the four coefﬁcients on Rit ¥ DRit for accruals reported in Table 5 is positive
and signiﬁcantly different from zero but all of the corresponding coefﬁcients for
CFO remain positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. This provides further
indication that ﬁnancial distress is inﬂuential with regard to the positive sensitivity
difference for accruals but not with regard to the positive sensitivity difference for
CFO.
Financial Distress and Other Measures of Conditional Conservatism not Based on
Equity Returns
Table 6 reports the parameter estimates from regression models (5) and (6). Model
(5) gives the earnings-change-reversal measure of conditional conservatism, and
model (6) shows the effect of ﬁnancial distress on this measure. The results from
model (5) indicate that earnings-change reversal is greater for negative earnings
changes than for positive earnings changes (b5,4 =- 0.503,t-statistic -6.30),indicative
of the existence of conditional conservatism by this measure and consistent with
Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). From model (6), the asymmetry in
earnings-change reversal is greater for relatively ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms both for
the BSM Score ﬁnancial-distress measure and the Z Score ﬁnancial-distress
measure: b6,8(BSM Score) =- 0.446, t-statistic -3.55; b6,8(Z Score) =- 0.433, t-statistic
-3.74. This result is consistent with our earlier inference that ﬁnancial distress is
positively associated with conditional accounting conservatism.Table (7) reports the
parameter estimates from regression models (7) and (8), which provide evidence as
to whether the ﬁnancial-distress effect on the earnings-change-reversal measure of
conditional conservatism from model (6) is associated with the accrual component
of earnings and/or the CFO component of earnings. The results suggest that it is
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TESTS OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND A MEASURE OF
CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM BASED ON EARNINGS-CHANGE REVERSAL
Model (5) Model (6)
Financial-distress
measure
BSM Score Z Score
Intercept (b5,1) -0.010 (b6,1) -0.001 -0.011
(-4.75)** (-0.46) (-4.34)**
DDEBEIi,t-1 (b5,2) -0.009 (b6,2) -0.004 -0.006
(-3.77)** (-1.77) (-1.95)
DEBEIi,t-1 (b5,3) -0.075 (b6,3) -0.119 -0.139
(-2.56)* (-2.16)* (-2.72)**
DEBEIi,t-1 ¥ DDEBEIi,t-1 (b5,4) -0.503 (b6,4) -0.224 -0.265
(-6.30)** (-1.94) (-2.35)*
FDi,t-1 (b6,5) -0.019 0.002
(-3.50)** (0.54)
DDEBEIi,t-1 ¥ FDi,t-1 (b6,6) -0.005 -0.003
(-0.72) (-0.40)
DEBEIi,t-1 ¥ FDi,t-1 (b6,7) 0.090 0.145
(0.99) (1.84)
DEBEIi,t-1 ¥ DDEBEIi,t-1 ¥ FDi,t-1 (b6,8) -0.446 -0.433
(-3.55)** (-3.74)**
Adjusted R
2 0.140 0.147 0.152
Notes:
1. Regression models (5) and (6) are estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series data for U.S.
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1989 to 2005.The number of observations is 21,513.The models are as follows:
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where DEBEIit is the change in EBEI of ﬁrm i from the accounting period ended at balance-sheet date
t-1 to the period ended at balance-sheet date t, scaled by total assets at t-1; DDEBEIi,t-1 is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one where DEBEIi,t-1 is negative and 0 otherwise; FDi,t-1 is a measure
of ﬁnancial distress, equal to either (i) the annually computed percentile rank of the Hillegeist et al.
BSM Score for ﬁrm i at the beginning of the period ended at time t or (ii) the annually computed
percentile rank of the Altman Z Score (times -1) at the beginning of the period ended at time t;t h eb
terms are regression coefﬁcients; the e terms are error terms.
2. t-statistics are given in parentheses.* (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level in a two-tailed test.
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and by year.
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TESTS OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND A MEASURE OF
CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM BASED ON EARNINGS-CHANGE REVERSAL:




BSM Score Z Score
Intercept (b7,1) -0.024 -0.050
(-5.98)** (-6.47)**
DDACCi,t-1 (b7,2) 0.052 0.087
(7.28)** (7.07)**
DACCi,t-1 (b7,3) -0.000 -0.000
(-1.09) (-0.85)
DACCi,t-1 ¥ DDACCi,t-1 (b7,4) 0.000 0.001
(1.60) (1.52)
FDi,t-1 (b7,5) -0.021 0.033
(-2.04)* (2.50)*
DDACCi,t-1 ¥ FDi,t-1 (b7,6) 0.033 -0.037
(2.95)** (-1.40)
DACCi,t-1 ¥ FDi,t-1 (b7,7) 0.001 0.001
(2.05)* (1.02)








BSM Score Z Score
Intercept (b8,1) -0.028 -0.033
(-4.54)** (-5.14)**
DDCFOi,t-1 (b8,2) 0.044 0.058
(6.56)** (7.31)**
DCFOi,t-1 (b8,3) 0.000 0.001
(1.26) (1.20)
DCFOi,t-1 ¥ DDCFOi,t-1 (b8,4) -0.000 -0.001
(-0.95) (-1.00)
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coefﬁcients for accruals are negative and signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5%
and 10% levels,respectively:b7,8(BSM Score) =- 0.001,t-statistic -3.65;b7,8(Z Score)
=- 0.002, t-statistic -1.84. The relevant coefﬁcients for CFO are positive and not
signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level:b8,8(BSM Score) = 0.001, t-statistic
1.27;b8,8(Z Score) = 0.002,t-statistic 1.08.This is consistent with the ﬁnancial-distress
Table 7
CONTINUED




BSM Score Z Score
FDi,t-1 (b8,5) 0.004 0.011
(0.48) (0.87)
DDCFOi,t-1 ¥ FDi,t-1 (b8,6) 0.014 -0.010
(1.40) (-0.64)
DCFOi,t-1 ¥ FDi,t-1 (b8,7) -0.001 -0.002
(-1.33) (-1.21)





1. Regression models (7) and (8) are estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series data for U.S.
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1989 to 2005.The number of observations is 21,513.The models are as follows:
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where DACCit (DCFOit) is the change in accruals (CFO) of ﬁrm i from the accounting period ended
at balance-sheet date t-1 to the period ended at balance-sheet date t, scaled by total assets at t-1;
DDACCi,t-1 (DDCFOi,t-1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one where DACCi,t-1 (DCFOi,t-1)
is negative and 0 otherwise; FDi,t-1 is a measure of ﬁnancial distress, equal to either (i) the annually
computed percentile rank of the Hillegeist et al. BSM Score for ﬁrm i at the beginning of the period
ended at time t or (ii) the annually computed percentile rank of the Altman Z Score (times -1) at
the beginning of the period ended at time t;t h eb terms are regression coefﬁcients; the e terms are
error terms.
2. t-statistics are given in parentheses. * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% (1%) level in a two-tailed
test. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and by year.
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therefore consistent with it arising from conservative accounting rather than from
other sources.
8
Table 8 reports the parameter estimates from regression models (9) and (10).
Model (9) gives the measure of conditional conservatism based on response of
accruals to cash ﬂows, and model (10) shows the effect of ﬁnancial distress on this
measure.The results from model (9) indicate that the association between CFO and
accruals is less negative in negative-CFO periods than in positive-CFO periods
(b9,4 = 0.867, t-statistic 8.67), indicative of the existence of conditional conservatism
by this measure and consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005). From model (10),
the asymmetry in the response of accruals to CFO is greater for relatively ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms both for the BSM Score ﬁnancial-distress measure and the Z Score
ﬁnancial-distress measure: b10,8(BSM Score) = 4.732, t-statistic 3.44; b10,8(Z Score) =
4.648, t-statistic 2.22.
9 This result is again consistent with our earlier inference that
ﬁnancial distress is positively associated with conditional accounting conservatism.
Overall,the results from our additional tests of asymmetric timeliness that are not
based on equity returns are consistent with our earlier inference that ﬁnancial
distress is positively associated with conditional accounting conservatism.
Sensitivity Tests
We test the sensitivity of our results to a number of variations in methodology.First,
we re-estimate regression models using as our measure of CFO Compustat data item
308 (Operating Activities-Net Cash Flow (Statement of Cash Flows)), without sub-
traction of Compustat data item 124 (Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Opera-
tions (Statement of Cash Flows)), with a corresponding accruals measure equal to
EBEI less this measure of CFO.Second,we recognize the possibility that CFO might
be affected indirectly by conditional conservatism through conservatism-related
decisions to expense items, in which case they would appear as part of CFO, or to
capitalize them,in which case they would appear as part as cash ﬂows from investing
activities.Therefore, we re-estimate regression models using as our dependent vari-
ables cash ﬂow from operating and investing activities (CFOI), deﬁned as CFO less
Compustat data item 311 (Investing Activities-Net Cash Flow (Statement of Cash
Flows)), and an accruals measure deﬁned as EBEI less CFOI. Third, we estimate
regression models separately for each of the seventeen years covered by the study
without allowing for clustering, and base our t-statistics on the seventeen-year aver-
ages of the regression coefﬁcients. Fourth, we use the raw measures of ﬁnancial
8 When the dummy variable for prior-period negative change in aggregate earnings (DDEBEIi,t-1)t h a t
is used in model (6) is used in place of DDACCi,t-1 in model (7) (for accruals), neither of the resultant
b7,8 coefﬁcients is signiﬁcantly different from zero. So, the ﬁnancial-distress effect in accruals reversal
that is observed when the prior-period bad-news indicator is negative change in accruals is not
observed when the prior-period bad-news indicator is negative change in aggregate earnings. When
DDEBEIi,t-1 is used in place of DDCFOi,t-1 in model (8) (for CFO),the resultant b8,8 coefﬁcients remain
insigniﬁcantly different from zero.
9 In a similar test using a shorter data period,Wang et al. (2009) report that coefﬁcients corresponding
to our b10,8 coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant.
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TEST OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND A MEASURE
OF CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM BASED ON RESPONSE OF ACCRUALS TO CASH
FLOW FROM OPERATIONS (CFO)
Model (9) Model (10)
Financial-distress measure
BSM Score Z Score
Intercept (b9,1) 0.032 (b10,1) 0.010 -0.144
(10.89)** (0.26) (-0.74)
DCFOit (b9,2) -0.028 (b10,2) -0.302 -0.119
(-4.18)** (-2.43)* (-0.52)
CFOit (b9,3) -0.921 (b10,3) -0.317 0.355
(-30.86)** (-1.98)* (0.41)
CFOit ¥ DCFOit (b9,4) 0.867 (b10,4) -2.918 -2.341
(8.67)** (-2.68)** (-1.93)
FDi,t-1 (b10,5) -0.082 0.202
(-0.48) (0.58)
DCFOit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b10,6) 0.424 0.151
(2.13)* (0.40)
CFOit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b10,7) -0.733 -2.065
(-0.91) (-1.16)
CFOit ¥ DCFOit ¥ FDi,t-1 (b10,8) 4.732 4.648
(3.44)** (2.22)*
Adjusted R
2 0.511 0.446 0.556
Notes:
1. Regression models (9) and (10) are estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series data for U.S.
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1989 to 2005.The number of observations is 21,513.The models are as follows:
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where ACCit and CFOit are accruals and CFO, respectively, of ﬁrm i for the accounting period ended
at balance-sheet date t,scaled by beginning-of-period total assets;DCFOit takes the value of one where
CFOit is negative and 0 otherwise; FDi,t-1 is a measure of ﬁnancial distress, equal to either (i) the
annually computed percentile rank of the Hillegeist et al.BSM Score for ﬁrm i at the beginning of the
period ended at time t or (ii) the annually computed percentile rank of theAltman Z Score (times -1)
at the beginning of the period ended at time t;t h eb terms are regression coefﬁcients; the e terms are
error terms.
2. t-statistics are given in parentheses.* (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level in a two-tailed test.
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and by year.
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conservatism not based on equity returns, we re-estimate the relevant regression
models using net income, as used by Ball and Shivakumar (2005), instead of EBEI.
Sixth, because our ﬁnancial-distress results may have arisen because the ﬁnancial-
distress measures reﬂect cross-sector differences in underlying debt-contracting-
related demand for accounting conservatism,we add a control for industry leverage.
Seventh, we perform our tests including ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Our inference that associa-
tion between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises primarily because relatively
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms are relatively conditionally conservative is robust to all of
these variations in methodology.The only notable ﬁnding from the sensitivity tests
is that the signiﬁcance at the 5% level of the effect of the BSM Score measure of
ﬁnancial distress on the sensitivity difference for CFO in model (4) (coefﬁcient b4,8
(BSM Score, CFO)) is not robust to any of the variations in methodology. This is
supportive of the ﬁnding that association between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD
arises predominantly through accruals rather than through CFO.
Summary
In common with many other studies, we observe a signiﬁcant sensitivity difference
for EBEI. This comprises signiﬁcant sensitivity differences for both the accruals
component of EBEI and the CFO component thereof.The existence of a sensitivity
difference for CFO suggests that the ESD arises to a signiﬁcant degree from factors
other than conditional conservatism, and may be indicative of the effect suggested
by Ball et al.(2009) whereby operating-cash-outﬂow responses to adverse events are
relatively immediate. With regard to our principal focus of interest, we report a
positive association between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD. There is some weak
evidence that this arises in part from the CFO component of earnings, but it arises
predominantly from the accruals component.This result is consistent with the effect
of ﬁnancial distress on the ESD arising primarily because relatively ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms adopt a relatively high degree of conditional conservatism rather
than because of other non-conservatism sources of association between ﬁnancial
distress and the ESD.Additional evidence from non-equity-return-based measures
of conditional conservatism and a number of sensitivity tests is consistent with this.
Our inference is consistent with the inference drawn by Basu (1997) in his brief
examination of the possibility that the ESD was due to termination-option-related
non-linearity in the relationship between equity earnings and equity return, but
contrasts with the inference drawn by Wang et al. (2009) from ESDs that are based
on estimates of entity return. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that
association between ﬁnancial distress and the ESD arises in part through a non-
conditional-conservatism route, our evidence is consistent with such association
arising primarily through a conditional-conservatism route.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we seek evidence relevant to the conditional-conservatism interpre-
tation of the excess of the sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative equity
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sensitivity difference (ESD). Motivated by concern about the conditional-
conservatism interpretation of the ESD and by recognition that the effect of
ﬁnancial distress could contribute to the ESD through a conditional-conservatism
route and/or through a non-conditional-conservatism route, we examine the asso-
ciation between measures of ﬁnancial distress and the ESD. In particular, we
examine whether such association arises through the accruals component of earn-
ings, which can reﬂect conditional accounting conservatism, or through the CFO
component, which cannot directly reﬂect conditional accounting conservatism. We
also provide additional evidence on the association between ﬁnancial distress and
conditional conservatism using other non-equity-return-based measures of condi-
tional conservatism.
In common with many other studies, we ﬁnd a positive sensitivity difference for
EBEI. This comprises signiﬁcant sensitivity differences for both the accruals com-
ponent of EBEI and the CFO component. The sensitivity difference for CFO sug-
gests that the ESD arises to a signiﬁcant degree from factors other than conditional
conservatism.We ﬁnd a positive association between each of our measures of ﬁnan-
cial distress and the ESD.There is some weak evidence that this association arises in
part from the CFO component of earnings, but it arises predominantly from the
accruals component.This is consistent with the association arising primarily from a
relatively high degree of conditional conservatism in relatively ﬁnancially distressed
ﬁrms rather than from other sources of ﬁnancial-distress-related non-linearity in the
relationship between equity return and earnings. Our results are consistent with
prior evidence that debt-related factors are an important source of conditional-
conservatism-related asymmetric timeliness in earnings.The inference that there is a
positive association between ﬁnancial distress and conditional conservatism is sup-
ported by evidence from measures of conditional conservatism other than the ESD.
Other studies have cast doubt on the conditional-conservatism interpretation of the
ESD by arguing that it reﬂects phenomena other than conditional conservatism.The
results of this study do not suggest that the effect of ﬁnancial distress gives signiﬁcant
additional cause to doubt the reliability of the ESD as an indicator of conditional
accounting conservatism.
references
Altman, E., ‘Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy’,
Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1968.
Ahmed, A., B. Billings, R. Morton and M. Stanford-Harris, ‘The Role of Accounting Conservatism in
Mitigating Bondholder–Shareholder Conﬂicts Over Dividend Policy and in Reducing Debt Costs’,
The Accounting Review, Vol. 77, No. 4, 2002.
Ahmed, A., and S. Duellman, ‘Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director Characteristics: An
Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 43, Nos 2/3, 2007.
Ball, R., S. Kothari and V. Nikolaev, Econometrics of the Basu Asymmetric Timeliness Coefﬁcient and
Accounting Conservatism, Working paper, University of Chicago Booth School of Business and
MIT Sloan School of Management, 2009.
Ball, R., S. Kothari and A. Robin, ‘The Effect of International Institutional Factors on Properties of
Accounting Earnings’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000.
ABACUS
312
© 2011 The Authors
Abacus © 2011 Accounting Foundation,The University of SydneyBall,R.,A. Robin and G. Sadka,‘Is Financial Reporting Shaped by Equity Markets or by Debt Markets?
An International Study of Timeliness and Conservatism’, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 13,
Nos 2/3, 2008.
Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar, ‘Earnings Quality in U.K. Private Firms: Comparative Loss-Recognition
Timeliness’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2005.
Basu,S.,‘The Conservatism Principle and theAsymmetricTimeliness of Earnings’,Journal ofAccounting
and Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1997.
Beatty, A., J. Weber and J. Yu,‘Conservatism and Debt’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 45,
Nos 2/3, 2008.
Beaver, W., and S. Ryan, Risky Debt, Mixed-Attribute Accounting, and the Identiﬁcation of Conditional
Conservatism, Working Paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stern School of
Business, New York University, 2009.
Beekes, W., P. Pope and S. Young,‘The Link Between Earnings Conservatism and Board Composition:
Evidence From the UK’, Corporate Governance:An International Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2004.
Black, F., and M. Scholes, ‘The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities’, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 81, No. 3, 1973.
Burgstahler,D.,and I. Dichev,‘Earnings,Adaptation and EquityValue’,TheAccounting Review,Vol. 72,
No. 2, 1997.
Bushman, R., and J. Piotroski, ‘Financial Reporting Incentives for Conservative Accounting: The Inﬂu-
ence of Legal and Political Institutions’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 42, Nos 1/2,
2006.
Dechow, P., ‘Accounting Earnings and Cash Flows as Measures of Firm Performance: The Role of
Accounting Accruals’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1994.
Dhaliwal, D., and S. Reynolds, ‘The Effect of the Default Risk of Debt on the Earnings Response
Coefﬁcient’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 69, No. 2, 1994.
Dietrich, J., K. Muller and E. Riedl,‘Asymmetric Timeliness Tests of Accounting Conservatism’, Review
of Accounting Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007.
Easton, P., V. Nikolaev and L. van Lent, Price-Convexity, Debt-Related Agency Costs and Timely
Loss Recognition, Working paper, University of Notre Dame, University of Chicago and Tilburg
University, 2008.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95, Statement
of Cash Flows, FASB, 1987.
——, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets
and Financial Liabilities, FASB, 2007.
Fischer, P., and R. Verrecchia,‘The Effect of Limited Liability on the Market Response to Disclosures’,
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1997.
García Lara, J., B. García Osma and E. Neophytou,‘Earnings Quality in Ex-Post Failed Firms’, Account-
ing and Business Research, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2009.
García Lara, J., B. García Osma and F. Penalva,‘Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Governance’,
Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2009.
Givoly, D., and C. Hayn. ‘The Changing Time-Series Properties of Earnings, Cash Flows and Accruals:
Has Financial Reporting Become Conservative?’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29,
No. 3, 2000.
Givoly, D., C. Hayn and A. Natarajan, ‘Measuring Reporting Conservatism’, The Accounting Review,
Vol. 82, No. 1, 2007.
Gow, I., G. Ormazabal and D. Taylor, ‘Correcting for Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Dependence in
Accounting Research’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 2010.
Guay, W., and R. Verrecchia,‘Discussion of an Economic Framework for Conservative Accounting and
Bushman and Piotroski (2006)’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 42, Nos 1/2, 2006.
Hayn,C.,‘The Information Content of Losses’,Journal ofAccounting and Economics,Vol. 20,No. 2,1995.
Hillegeist,S.,E. Keating,D. Cram and K. Lundstedt,‘Assessing the Probability of Bankruptcy’,Review of
Accounting Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004.
FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND THE EARNINGS-SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCE
313
© 2011 The Authors
Abacus © 2011 Accounting Foundation,The University of SydneyHribar, P., and D. Collins,‘Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications for Empirical Research’, Journal
of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2002.
Krishnan, G., ‘The Association Between Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise and Asymmetric Timeliness
of Earnings’, Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2005.
LaFond, R., and S. Roychowdhury, ‘Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism’, Journal of
Accounting Research, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008.
LaFond, R., and R. Watts, ‘The Information Role of Conservatism’, The Accounting Review,V o l .8 3 ,
No. 2, 2008.
Lobo,G.,and J. Zhou,‘Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting IncreaseAfter the Sarbanes-OxleyAct?
Initial Evidence’, Accounting Horizons. Vol. 20, No. 1, 2006.
Merton,R.,‘On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:The Risk Structure of Interest Rates’,Journal of Finance,
Vol. 29, No. 2, 1974.
Ohlson, J., ‘Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy’, Journal of Accounting
Research, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1980.
Pae, J., D. Thornton and M. Welker, ‘The Link Between Earnings Conservatism and the Price-to-Book
Ratio’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2005.
Patatoukas, P., and J. Thomas, Evidence of Conditional Conservatism: Fact or Artifact, Working Paper,
Yale University, 2009.
Petersen, M.,‘Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches’, Review
of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2008.
Plummer, C., and S. Tse,‘The Effect of Limited Liability on the Informativeness of Earnings: Evidence
From the Stock and Bond Markets’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1999.
Pope,P.,and M. Walker.,‘International Differences in theTimeliness,Conservatism and Classiﬁcation of
Earnings’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, Supplement, 1999.
Roychowdhury,S.,and R. Watts,‘AsymmetricTimeliness of Earnings,Market-to-Book and Conservatism
in Financial Reporting’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 44, Nos 1/2, 2007.
Sivakumar,K.,and G. Waymire,‘EnforceableAccounting Rules and Income Measurement by Early 20th
Century Railroads’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2003.
Subramanyam,K.,‘The Pricing of DiscretionaryAccruals’,Journal ofAccounting and Economics,V ol.22,
Nos 1–3, 1996.
Subramanyam, K., and J. Wild, ‘The Going Concern Assumption and the Informativeness of Earnings’,
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1996.
Vassalou, M., and Y. Xing,‘Default Risk in Equity Returns’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2004.
Wang, R., C. Ó hÓgartaigh and A. van Zijl, The Impact of Default Risk on the Basu Measure of
Accounting Conservatism, Working Paper, Eastern Illinois University, Victoria University of
Wellington and University College Dublin, 2009.
Zhang, J.,‘The Contracting Beneﬁts of Accounting Conservatism to Lenders and Borrowers’, Journal of
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2008.
ABACUS
314
© 2011 The Authors
Abacus © 2011 Accounting Foundation,The University of Sydney